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The Medicines Patent Pool: Promoting
Access and Innovation for Life-Saving
Medicines Through Voluntary Licenses
by KRISTA L. COx*
I. Introduction
In response to a crisis caused by lack of access to essential
medicines in developing countries, a proposal for a patent pool
emerged. Initially support stemmed primarily from two non-
governmental organizations: M6decins Sans Fronti&res/Doctors
Without Borders (MSF)1 and Knowledge Ecology International
(KEI).2 The proposal suggested the creation of an entity that would
rely on voluntary agreements by patent holders, particularly private
pharmaceutical companies to license essential medicines for the
benefit of patients in developing countries. Ultimately, UNITAID
supported the creation of the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) whose
mission is to enable production and distribution of affordable generic
versions of HIV/AIDS medicines.3
The MPP, a new entity, has now concluded two licensing
agreements and is currently in negotiations with several
* Attorney, Knowledge Ecology International (KEI), Washington, D.C. J.D.,
Notre Dame Law School; B.A., University of California Santa Barbara. I am deeply
indebted to James Love, Manon Ress, and Thiru Balasubramaniam for invaluable
suggestions, edits and assistance; to all those who have participated in a broad dialogue,
deepening my knowledge and interest in these issues, but in particular: Judit Rius Sanjuan,
Brook K. Baker, Ellen 't Hoen, Chan Park, and Ethan Guillen; and finally, to Kameron
Cox. I am also very thankful to the Zion Maffeo and the Hastings Science & Technology
Law Journal. Any errors are, of course, my own.
1. MtEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES/DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS ACCESS
CAMPAIGN, www.msfaccess.org/spotlight-on/patent-pool (last visited Feb. 24, 2012)
www.msf.org [hereinafter MSF].
2. See KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L, www.keionline.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2012)
[hereinafter KEI].
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pharmaceutical companies. Existing and future licenses will be critical
to improving access to affordable HIV/AIDS medicines for patients
living in the developing world. An analysis of the background to the
MPP's creation, the context in which it operates, and its current
licenses can help in evaluating the success of the MPP and how to
improve future licenses. As one of several actors and strategies, the
MPP has great potential for improving access to medicines.
Part II of this Article provides context for the access to
medicines problem and background to patent pools, including
examples of prior pools. Part III of this Article describes the goals
and structure of the MPP. It also details and analyzes the specific
provisions of the current MPP licenses, with a particular focus on the
first license agreement to the MPP by a private pharmaceutical
company. Part IV explores mechanisms to improve the MPP license
agreements, including two specific suggestions to incentivize greater
participation in voluntary licensing measures. Finally, this Article
concludes that the use of all available tools-both those that currently
exist as well as those being considered-should be deployed to
strengthen the MPP and promote access to affordable mechanisms.
II. Patent Pools
A. Intellectual Property: Barriers to Access and Innovation
Tragically, an estimated one-third of disease-related deaths
worldwide stem from lack of access to existing medical treatments.4
HIV/AIDS reveals a particularly significant public health crisis with
approximately 33.3 million persons living with HIV/AIDS by the end
of 2009.' Access to antiretroviral medicines appears particularly bleak
and, "[o]f the 12 million people living with HIV/AIDS in developing
countries who will die within 3 years without immediate access to
affordable antiretroviral medicines, only 4 million were receiving
treatment at the end of 2008."'6 HIV/AIDS medicines are critical in
saving the lives of patients, but also in preventing the spread of this
disease. A study by the NIH found that "earlier initiation of
4. Brook K. Baker, Patents, Pricing, and Access to Essential Medicines in Developing
Countries, 11 VIRTUAL MENTOR 527, 527 (2009), available at http://virtualmentor.ama-
assn.org/2009/07/pfo4l-0907.html.
5. WHO, Global Summary of the AIDS Epidemic (2009), http://www.who.it/hiv/
data/2009_global-summary.png (last visited Feb. 24, 2012)
6. Baker, supra note 4.
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antiretrovirals led to a 96 percent reduction in HIV transmission to
the HIV-uninfected partner.,
7
For many patients in developing countries, access does not
depend solely on the physical availability of the drug at a distributor,
but also relies on the affordability of the drug.8 Furthermore, because
patients develop resistance to antiretroviral drugs, newer medicines,
which also often have the benefit of reduced side effects, will be
needed.
The World Health Organization's (WHO) Commission on
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH)
has notes the framework for evaluating whether public health is
protected and access to medicines is made available in a meaningful
manner.' The framework considers the availability, acceptability,
effectiveness and affordability and whether the treatment is "of the
lowest possible cost" to ensure access.'0 Despite the fact that the right
to health has been recognized as a fundamental human right" and
that "access to medicines is a fundamental element in achieving
progressively the full realization" of this right, 2 barriers still exist and
7. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Treating HIV Infected People
with Antiretrovirals Significantly Reduces Transmission to Partners, NIH NEWS, May 12,
2011, http://www.nih.gov/news/health/may2Ol 1/niaid-12.htm (last visited Feb. 2012).
8. Id.
9. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECrUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH, (WHO Press 2006), available at
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A-art.12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI), Dec. 16, 1966
("The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health" and States
must "[create] conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention
in the event of sickness"); Id. at art. 15 ("The State Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone:. . . To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its
applications").
12. Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, Human Rights Council Res.
12/12, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 12th Sess., Sept. 14-Oct. 2, 2009, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/12/50, at 26; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI) A, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966) ("Every human being has
the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life."); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (IIl) A
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (Ill) art. 25 (Dec. 10, 1948) ("Everyone has the right to a standard
of living adequate for the necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control."); Convention on the Rights of a Child art. 24, Sept. 2,
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millions of persons, particularly in the developing world, are denied
treatment.
Intellectual property rights often lead to monopolies and high
prices, which are barriers to access to these medicines. Patents also
allow rights holders to use inventions in combination with new follow-
on innovations, such as fixed dose combinations or improved methods
of storing or delivering the drug.
The high intellectual property barriers can create what has been
called the "tragedy of the anticommons."' 3 Patent thickets, arising
from cases of fragmented ownership or the blocking of critical
"upstream" research is patented, can also impede further
development of useful new products. The result is that "multiple
owners have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no
one has an effective privilege of use. Once an anticommons emerges,
collecting rights into usable private property is often brutal and
slow."
14
In order to promote the right to health, the intellectual property
issues that prevent or hamper adequate access for those in the
developing world must be addressed. Patent pools, operating within
the existing intellectual property system, serve as one mechanism to
overcome the problems of access and innovation.
B. Collective Management to Address Intellectual Property Barriers
Patent pools serve as systems of collective management of
intellectual property rights, specifically for patents.'5 One definition
provides that a patent pool serves as:
An agreement between two or more patent owners to aggregate
(pool) their patents and to license them to one another or third
parties. Pools usually offer standard licensing terms to licensees
1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 ("State Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of
the highest attainable standard of health and facilities for the treatment of illness and
rehabilitation of health. State Parties shall strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his
or her right of access to such health care services.... State Parties undertake to promote
and encourage international co-operation with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the right recognized in the present article. In this regard, particular account
shall be taken of the needs of developing countries.").
13. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., IGWG Briefing Paper on Patent Pools: Collective Management of
Intellectual Property-The Use of Patent Pools to Expand Access to Essential Medical
Technologies, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, (June 3, 2007), http://keionline.
org/content/view/65/1 [hereinafter IGWG Briefing Paper].
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and allocate a portion of the licensing fees (royalties) to patent
owners according to a pre-set formula or procedure.
16
This definition reflects the fact that patent pools can take a
variety of different forms and breadth to accomplish different goals,
including to address upstream research and development concerns as
well as downstream access issues.17 They have been widely used across
many different sectors including for sewing machines in the
nineteenth century, airplanes during World War I and, more recently,
to address the necessity for common standards in technology fields.
18
The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
recognized the benefits of patent pools as including: 1) clearing of
blocking patents; 2) reduction in licensing transaction costs by
reducing the need for multiple agreements; 3) management of
multiple owners and stacking of royalties, 4) facilitation of
professional management of negotiations and administration of the
agreements; 5) reduction of infringement litigation costs; 6) the
potential to encompass non-patent technology and know-how; and 7)
the potential to facilitate technology transfer and scale up capacity
building and access in developing countries.19
With the goal of improving access to medicines, in 200620 KEI
2'
and MSF proposed a patent pool to UNITAID for essential medical
technologies in order to lower prices, promote innovation, enhance
capacity to manage legal issues, and permit larger economies of scale,
16. Id. (citing Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Exchange: The
Case of Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 123 (Rochelle Dreyfuss, Diane L.
Zimmerman & Harry First eds., 2001)); Joel I. Klein, Address to the American
Intellectual Property Law Association on the Subject of Cross-Licensing and Antitrust
Law (May 2, 1997) (noting that United States v. Line Materials, 333 U.S. 287, 313 n.24
(1948) states that the term "patent pool" is not a term of art).
17. IGWG Briefing Paper, supra note 15.
18. See David Serafino, Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and
Management Structures, KEI Research Note 2007:6 (June 4, 2007), http://keionline.org/con
tent/view/69/I (last visited Nov. 27, 2011).
19. IGWG Briefing Paper, supra note 15 (citing U.S. Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property (Apr. 6, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm).
20. The existing MPP was based on the proposal in 2006 by both KEI and MSF to
UNITAID. However, KEI previously proposed an "Essential Health Care Patent Pool"
modeled on a patent pool that was created for the aircraft industry in WWI. The
"Essential Health Care Patent Pool" was first proposed in 2002 at the International AIDS
Conferences in Barcelona.
21. At the time of the 2006 proposal KEI went by the name "Consumer Project on
Technology (CPTech)."
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among other goals.22  Ultimately, a proposal specifically for
HIV/AIDS medicines was developed and UNITAID adopted the
proposal.
III. The Medicines Patent Pool
The MPP came into existence following a UNITAID Board
resolution on December 14, 2009, with the intention of "mak[ing]
newer medicines available in patient-adapted form, at lower prices,
for low- and middle-income countries" for HIV/AIDS patients.23
Since its creation, it has concluded two negotiations, one with the
U.S. government and one with a private pharmaceutical company.
A. Overview of the Medicines Patent Pool
Modeled after the Manufacturers Aircraft Association (MAA)
patent pool,24 the MPP seeks to overcome the intellectual property
barriers to access. It is important to note that participation in the
MPP exists as a purely voluntary action on the part of patent holders.
As a result, the MPP must be evaluated in the appropriate context
and expectations for the resulting licenses must reflect the voluntary
nature of the negotiations.
The MPP focuses on encouraging licenses for HIV/AIDS
medicines and operates by obtaining voluntary licenses from patent
holders, then non-exclusively licensing to third parties who can create
22. Id.
23. Press Release, UNITAID, UNITAID Executive Board Approves Breakthrough
Plan to Make AIDS Treatment More Widely Available at Lower Cost (Dec. 14, 2009),
available at http://www.unitaid.eu/en/The-Medicines-Patent-Pool-Initiative.html; see also
Press Release, MSF, Entry Into Medicines Patent Pool is a Welcome First Step (Sep. 30,
2010), available at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfmid=4768&cat=
press-release (However, this addition to the patent pool does not "clear the way for
generic versions of darunavir because additional patents are held by Tibotec, owned by
US firm Johnson & Johnson, undermining wider access to the drug.").
24. The Manufacturers Aircraft Association patent pool was created in 1917 in
response to the U.S. government policy objectives as it drew close to entering into World
War I. Those owning essential patents on airplane manufacturing components, such as the
Wright brothers, charged high royalty rates and the expensive litigation resulted in
stagnation in innovation for the airline industry. The United States believed it needed to
increase production of aircraft for World War I and a patent pool was recommended and
created in response. This pool initially held membership of eleven aircraft manufacturers
and eventually grew to include nearly every manufacturer of aircrafts purchased by the
U.S. government. All aircraft manufacturers were required to join the association.
Royalties were lowered from $1,000 per plane to $200 per plane and in 1918 were
eventually lowered further to $100 per plane.
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generic versions for use in developing countries. 25 Royalties from the
sale of generic versions are then paid to patent holders.2 ' This model
promotes generic competition, ultimately driving down prices27 and
making these essential medicines more affordable, and thus more
accessible, for patients in low- and middle-income countries. The
MPP is also designed to help facilitate the development of co-
formulated or fixed-dose combination, thereby simplifying treatment
and encouraging better compliance 8
In addition to the obvious benefits of negotiating licenses to
promote access to generic medicines, the MPP also helps to reduce
transaction costs. A generic manufacturer can sign a sublicensing
agreement from the MPP rather than separately negotiating several
licenses from various patent holders.29
25. Frequently Asked Questions About the Medicines Patent Pool,
MEDICINESPATENTPOOL.ORG, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/RESOU RCES-
PUBLICATIONS/FAQ#eztocl012_9 (last visited Dec. 2,2011).
26. Id.
27. In 1998, for example, a study by the Congressional Budget Office found that "As
the number of manufacturers rises, the average prescription price of a generic drug falls.
CBO's analysis shows that when one to 10 firms are manufacturing and distributing
generic forms of a particular drug, the generic retail price of that drug averages about 60
percent of the brand-name price. When more than 10 manufacturers have entered the
market, the average generic prescription price falls to less than half of the brand-name
price." Congressional Budget Office, How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has
Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry, (July 1998), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=655.
28. Id.
29. Jorge Bermudez & Ellen 't Hoen, The UNITAID Patent Pool Initiative: Bringing
Patents Together for the Common Good, 4 THE OPEN AIDS JOURNAL 37, 38 (2010) ("In
the absence of a patent pool, a company might need to obtain license from at least three
different patent holders to be able to develop, produce, export and sell an ARV FDC. A
very concrete example is the need for an FDC of the newly WHO-recommended first-line
antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS, which would consist of tenofovir (Gilead),
lamivudine (GlaxoSmithKline) and either nevirapine (Boehringer-Ingelheim) or efavirenz
(Bristol Mysers Squibb). An FDC of three of these drugs currently does not exist or is in
limited supply. The patents on every compound in this triple-therapy are held by a
different company. A generic company seeking voluntary licenses for the development
and production of these FDCs would have to obtain licenses from four different patent-
holders. However, if these patents could be combined in a patent pool the generic
company would only have to deal with the pool, which would considerably decrease
transaction costs and risk. Any qualified company that wanted to use the inventions could
get a license from the pool. The patent pool would be a one-stop-shop for all parties
involved-it would facilitate the legal and bureaucratic processes involve din obtaining
licenses, reduce transaction costs and increase access to the intellectual property needed to
make important medicines.").
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B. The Medicine Patent Pool's First License:
The U.S. National Institute of Health
On September 30, 2010, the MPP received its first license when
the White House announced that the National Institute of Health
(NIH) issued a license for NIH-owned patents on darunavir ° This
contribution by the NIH "builds on the President's previous
commitment to support humanitarian licensing policies to ensure that
medications developed with U.S. taxpayer dollars are available off-
patent in developing countries."31 This license was royalty-free and
non-exclusive, related to the NIH's method of treatment patents on
32darunavir, an important protease inhibitor.33 The geographic scope
for this license was broad, encompassing all low- and middle-income
countries as defined by the World Bank.34 The field of use in this
license was drawn broadly, including the "treatment and prevention
of medical conditions affecting humans.""
Many in the public health community applauded this license, the
first for the MPP.36 The provisions making the license royalty-free and
30. NIH's patent on the method of treatment on darunavir is issued patent number
7,470,506 and listed in the FDA Orange Book with an expiration date of June 23, 2019.
31. Hillary Chen US Government First to Share Patents with Medicines Patent Pool,
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY (Sept. 30, 2010) available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/09/30/us-government-first-share-patents-with-medicines-patent-
pool.
32. Public Health Service, Non-Exclusive Patent License Agreement, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF HEALTH LICENSE (Sept. 14, 2010), available at http://www.
medicinespatentpoo.org/content/download/214/1227/version/l/file/MPPF+Patent+License
+Full+Executed+%28Sept+2010%29-NS.pdf.
33. Id. These patents were discovered as a class of compounds in 1998 by scientists at
the NIH National Cancer Institute and the University of Illinois-Chicago as being
particularly effective for patients who had developed resistance to older HIV/AIDS drugs.
Eventually, one compound was developed into darunavir.
34. Id. at art. 3.1 ("PHS hereby grants and Licensee accepts, subject to the terms and
conditions of this Agreement, a royalty-free nonexclusive license under the Licensed
Patent Rights in the Licensed Territory to make, have made, and to use, but not to sell the
Licensed Products and Licensed Process in the Licensed Fields of Use for the purposes of
supplying the Licensed Products in low- and middle-income countries, as defined by the
World Bank.").
35. Id. at Annex B.
36. See, e.g., James Love, Director, The NIH Patent License Agreement with the
UNITA ID Supported Medicines Patent Pool for Patents on Darunavir (Sept. 30, 2011),
available at http://keionline.org/node/956 ("The announcement today by the White House
that the NIH is providing a royalty-free license for patents on darunavir to the Medicines
Patent Pool is a welcome political statement that the Obama Administration recognizes
the importance of a competitive supply of low cost generic medicines in the struggle to
make AIDS treatment sustainable. The involvement of NIH Director Francis Collins
provides a signal to other patent owners that the time is now to embrace a policy of open
[Vol. 4:2
non-exclusive and covering all low- and middle-income countries fit
squarely into the goals of the MPP. Additionally, the fact that the
U.S. government was willing to license its patents to the MPP
provided political support to the new institution. NIH, as the world's
largest funder of biomedical research, gave credence to the MPP as
licensing of patents to the Medicines Patent Pool. There is much more the NIH can do,
and much more other patent owners can do. This is the beginning of a campaign to obtain
licenses voluntarily. The alternatives to the success of voluntary measures are confronting
the challenges of obtaining non-voluntary licenses, or shrinking the number of persons
who will receive treatment. I think everyone recognizes the stakes are very high."); Press
Release, MSF, NIH Entry Into Medicines Patent Pool is a Welcome First Step (Sept. 30,
2010), available at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=4768&
cat=press-release; Press Release, HealthGAP, Activists Applaud NIH Support for the
Medicines Patent Pool But It Won't Fix President Obama's Broken AIDS Funding
Promises (Sept. 30, 2011), available at http://www.healthgap.orglpress/patent-pool
response.htm ("'Hopefully this positive step by NIH will encourage drug companies
including Gilead, Abbott, and ViiV to promptly license patents on HIV medicines that
they hold to the Medicines Patent Pool as well, using the same positive licensing terms as
NIH,' said Brook Baker of Health GAP. 'If other rights holders share their patents with
the Patent Pool alongside NIH, medicine price reductions and the creation of novel fixed-
dose combination medicines will follow, which will save lives."'); Press release, Oxfam,
Oxfam welcomes breakthrough on access to HIV medicines (Sept. 30, 2011), available at
http://reliefweb.int/node/369405 ("Oxfam today welcomed an agreement between the
UNITAID-backed Medicine Patent Pool Foundation (MPPF) and the US National
Institutes of Health (NIH) to license the antiretroviral drug darunavir to the patent pool.
The pool was set up to reduce the cost of HIV medicines. Mogha Kamal-Yanni, Oxfam
senior policy adviser, said: 'This decision could be a real breakthrough in making new HIV
medicines available and affordable to poor people."'); Press Release, Afr. Servs. Comm.,
African Services Committee Applauds US NIH as First to License Patents to MPP (Sept.
30, 2011), available at http://www.africanservices.org/index.php/Press-Room/ASC-
Applauds-US-NIH-and-MPP-Partnership ("The US National Institute of Health (NIH)
has become the first patent-holder to license patents to the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP),
established by UNITAID this year. In so doing, the NIH and the US Government have
taken a large stride forward in validating the HIV Medicines Patent Pool, and raised a
leadership challenge to others within the pharmaceutical industry to follow suit. This
contribution [to the MPP] marks a significant advance in the effort to provide affordable
life-saving HIV medication to those in low- and middle-income countries. This move is a
necessary step in meeting the goal of universal access to HIV treatment, and we hope will
be an indication of the Obama Administration's ongoing commitment to putting patients
right above patent rights," (quoting Kim Nichols, Co-Executive Director of the African
Services Committee and UNITAID alternate board member.)); Press Release,
Universities Allied for Essential Medicines, NIH Acts on Commitment to Global Access
Licensing by Licensing Patents to Medicines Patent Pool (Sept. 30, 2010), available at
http://essentialmedicine.org/story/2010/09/30/nih-acts-commitment-global-access-licensing-
licensing-patents-medicines-patent-pool ("UAEM lauds the NIH for specifying all low-
and middle-income countries as potential beneficiaries of the license, including countries
such as Brazil, India and China where the vast majority of the world's poor still live. The
NIH is sending a strong signal to universities and public institutions to improved global
health.... Furthermore, universities should license their medicines-related patents to the
Pool, and should follow the precedent set by the NIH in agreeing to equitable and
transparent licensing terms.").
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an institution and could also set an example for other publicly funded
research institutions, universities, or patent holders to follow. 7
While this first license from the NIH certainly represented a
welcome step forward, it is important to note that these licenses did
not permit the generic production of darunavir for the benefit of
HIV/AIDS patients. The NIH is not the sole patent holder and the
private pharmaceutical company; Tibotec/Johnson & Johnson hold
other patents related to darunavir18 Unfortunately, Tibotec/Johnson
& Johnson has not yet joined in negotiations with the MPP 9 despite
the fact that three of its drugs-darunavir (DRV), etravine (ETR)
and rilpivirine-are on the list of target medicines for the MPP. 40
37. Medicines Patent Pool, Questions and Answers: The US National Institutes of
Health (NIH) License to the Medicines Patent Pool, UNITAID.EU (Sept. 2010),
http://www.unitaid.eu/images/news/patentpool/20100930 nih-license+q%26a-en.pdf (last
visited Dec. 6, 2011).
38. See Ed Silverman, NIH Joins AIDS Patent Pool; Where is Pharma?,
PHARMALOT, (Oct. 10, 2010), available at http://www.pharmalot.com/2010/10/nih-joins-
aids-drugs-patent-pool-where-is-pharma/ ("Although encouraged by the NIH action,
Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) says the pharmaceutical industry
must now take the same step. 'This single patent isn't enough to allow a cheaper version of
the medicines to be produced. We need to build on this. The onus is on the drug
companies that own patents on this and other key AIDS medicines to put their patents in
the pool,' says Tido von Schoen-Angerer, who runs MSF's Campaign for Access to
Essential Medicines. 'If companies are genuine about wanting to boost access to newer
medicines, then they must license the patents that are actually blocking generic and will
make a real difference to people's lives'... For instance, the NIH Office of Technology
Transfer has previously granted non-exclusive licenses to these patents, including to
Tibotec, which is a unit of Johnson & Johnson, for darunavir, known commercially as
Prezista. But von Schoen-Angerer notes this particular NIH patent will not free the way
for generic versions of darunavir, because additional patents are held by Tibotec.").
39. Following a "pool party" protest outside of Johnson & Johnson's offices and
pharmacies in London over Johnson & Johnson's refusal to join negotiations with the
MPP, a spokesperson for the company stated "On January 31, we responded to MPPF and
indicated that we generally support the MPPF and its goals, but are not starting
negotiations for our antiretroviral compounds at this time." Ed Silverman, Johnson &
Johnson and Bikinis: A Patent Pool Party, PHARMALOT.COM (Mar. 31, 2011 ), available at
http://www.pharmalot.com/2011/03/j ohnson-johnson-and-bikinis-a-patent-pool-party/.
40. Medicines Patent Pool, Target Medicines, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/
WHAT-WE-DO/Target-Medicines (last visited Dec. 3, 2011). Abbott Laboratories and
Merck & Co. are two other companies targeted by the MPP that have not yet entered into
negotiations. Abbott Laboratories holds the patents to targeted compounds Lopinavir
(LPV) and Ritonavir (r) while Merck & Co. holds the main patents to Efavirenz (EFV),
Raltegravir (RAL) and Vicriviroc. The remaining seven targeted entities have either
completed license agreements with the MPP (these include NIH and Gilead) or have
entered formal negotiations. Those companies currently in formal negotiations and their
respective target products include Boehringer-Ingelheim (holding Nevirapine or NVP),
Bristol-Myers Squibb (holding Atazanavir or ATV), Roche (holding Saquinavir or SQV),
Sequoia Pharmaceuticals, and Viiv Healthcare (holding Lamivudine or 3TC, Abacavir or
ABC, Fosamprenavir or FSV, and Maraviroc.).
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Until Johnson & Johnson enters into formal negotiations with the
MPP and licenses its products to the pool, sublicensees cannot
manufacture the drug for use or sale where the darunavir patents
exist. Although efforts have been made to encourage Johnson &
Johnson participation in the MPP, on December 19, 2011, the• • 41
company issued a statement formally refusing to enter negotiations.
Pharmaceutical companies should commit to the corporate social
responsibility they claim to exercise42 and ensure life-saving medicines
are accessible by those living in developing countries4 by licensing to
the patent pool.
41. Ed Silverman, Just Say No: J&J Rebuffs Medicines Patent Pool, Pharmalot (Dec.
20, 2011), http://www.pharmalot.com/201I/12/johnson-johnson-rebuffs-medicines-patent-
pool/; see also Medicines Patent Pool, Statement on Johnson & Johnson Decision on
Negotiations (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/NEWS-ROOM/News-
from-the-Pool/Statement-on-J-and-J.
42. Johnson and Johnson, for example, states that "As a global health care company,
Johnson & Johnson has a responsibility to help create a world where people across all
economic and social circumstances have access to the treatments they need." Johnson and
Johnson, Access to Medicines, http://www.jnj.com/responsibility/ESG/Social/Globa1-
Health/Access toMedicines (last visited Mar. 21, 2012). Merck's corporate responsibility
statement on health similarly states, "As a global healthcare company, Merck believes it
has a responsibility to help increase access to medicines, vaccines and quality healthcare
worldwide. In this effort, we are committed to discovering smart, sustainable ways to
expand access, especially in parts of the world where there is limited or no healthcare
infrastructure and resources. Given the enormity of this challenge, we believe we can
make the strongest contribution by working in partnership with others-governments,
donors, patient organizations, healthcare professionals, nongovernmental organizations,
academic institutions, multilateral organizations and others within the private sector."
Merck, http://www.merckresponsibility.com/giving-at-merck/health/home.html (last visited
Mar. 21, 2012).
43. Although companies have entered into their own voluntary licenses, the
Medicines Patent Pool represents a more efficient process for all those involved; rather
than individually negotiating licenses and terms with each developing country and generic
manufacturer, a single entity can negotiate the license. Gilead, as will be discussed in
greater detail below, previously issued a voluntary license for one of its drugs, but the
license the MPP negotiated on the same pharmaceutical provided better terms for patients
in the developing world. The medicines at issue are life-saving drugs for HIV-positive
patients. More than half of the world lives on less than two dollars a day and cannot afford
the high monopoly prices charged in high-income countries, nor can developing countries
afford to support monopoly priced treatments. A company joining the patent pool might
also benefit from the visibility and public acknowledgement that it is taking corporate
responsibility seriously. It should be noted that patients in these countries cannot afford
the prohibitively high prices charged by pharmaceutical companies and by licensing to the
MPP, the company can receive royalty payments on the sales of generic versions of the
drug that it otherwise might not receive. Due to funding shortages and the rising number
of patients needing treatment, donor organizations and governments will find it
increasingly difficult to meet treatment targets without generic versions of these
medicines.
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C. Gilead Licenses Multiple Products to Medicines Patent Pool
On July 12, 2011, the MPP and Gilead Sciences announced the
first license by a private company to the patent pool.4 This license
agreement covered patents for tenofovir (TDF) and emtricitabine
(FTC), as well as several pipeline drugs including elvitegravir (EVG),
cobisistat (COBI) and a four-drug, fixed-dose combination of these
products known as "the quad., 45 The licenses contained in the
agreement specifically cover production of TDF,
46 EVG,47 COBI, 4
and the quad,49 as well as a covenant not to sue on FTC. 0
The licenses also create a one-time technology transfer of know-
how on the products, without any obligations of additional royalties.5
Additionally, the agreement grants generic manufacturer licensees
"NCE Exclusivity52 or other regulatory exclusivity waivers as may be
required by the applicable regulatory authorities in order to
manufacture or sell Product in the Territory. ..."" The significant
provisions of this agreement are detailed below.
44. Medicines Patent Pool, Medicines Patent Pool Signs Licenses to Increase Access to
HiV/AIDS Medicines, MEDICINESPATENTPOOL.ORG (July 12, 2011), http://www.
medicinespatentpool.org/LlCENSING/Current-Licences/Medicines-Patent-Pool-and-
Gilead-Licence-Agreement/Pool-UNITAID-joint-press-release. Notably, this license
achieves one of the goals of reducing transaction costs with the result being the licensing
of EVG to Gilead from Japan Tobacco. A generic licensing company wishing to make the
quad would have had to negotiate separately with Gilead and Japan Tobacco if the patent
pool did not exist.
45. Medicines Patent Pool License Agreement with Gilead Sciences, Inc. (July 11,
2011), http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/LICENSING/Current-Licences (follow link
labeled "Main licensing agreement between the Pool and Gilead") (last visited Feb. 24.
2012) [hereinafter Main Gilead Licensing Agreement].




50. Id. at art. 5.3 provides "Covenant Concerning Certain Gilead Patents. Gilead
covenants and agrees that it shall not, at any time during the term of this Agreement, bring
any claim or proceeding of any kind or nature against MPP in relation to any of the
pending and issued patents identified in Appendix 3 hereto (the "Emtricitabine Patents")
to the extent that MPP remains in compliance with the terms and conditions set forth in
this Agreement and each Sublicense Agreement.
51. Medicines Patent Pool, Gilead Sciences, Inc. and Generic company license
[hereinafter Form Gilead Sublicense Agreement] art. 5.4, http://www.medicinespatent
pool.org/content/download/482/2855/version/l/file/Form+3-way+Generic+License+ %28
FINAL%29+08JULI 1.pdf (last visited Dec. 6,2011).
52. Main Gilead Licensing Agreement, supra note 45, at 3(defined in the agreement
as "five years of marketing exclusivity granted by FDA pursuant to its authority under 21
U.S.C. §§355(c)(3)(E)(ii) and 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).").
53. Form Gilead Sublicense Agreement, supra note 51, at art. 6.3.
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1. Licensed Products
The Gilead license involves four HIV/AIDS drugs and a fixed-
dose combination of these drugs. The first product, TDF, is an
antiretroviral drug used in combination with other antiretrovirals for
treatment of HIV and hepatitis B.' The World Health Organization
has recommended that the use of TDF to replace an older
antiretroviral, stavudine, because TDF causes fewer harmful side
effects." FTC is another antiretroviral that blocks enzymes used in
viral replication. 6
Significantly, the Gilead license covers drugs in the development
stage, as well. COBI acts as a booster making antiretrovirals more
effective at lower dosages, thus reducing their side effects.57 EVG,
another Gilead pipeline product, is an antiretroviral . Gilead expects
FDA approval of these drugs in the latter part of 2012 and the
sublicensees will be permitted to begin preparations to market these
drugs, as well as the quad, after Gilead receives regulatory approval.
The inclusion of these pipeline drugs in the license agreement is
highly significant because it will permit early generic competition for
these products, driving down the prices for these new treatments for
the benefit of those living in the cove*l territories. The MPP/Gilead
agreement thus creates the potential for developing country patients
to have earlier access to affordable new HIV/AIDS medicines.
2. Field of Use
The licensed products include a broad field of use, defined to
include (or potentially include for the pipeline products) uses beyond
HIV/AIDS. The agreement states:
"Field" shall mean the treatment and prophylaxis of HIV
infection, provided, however, that (a) for Product containing
TDF as its sole active pharmaceutical ingredient, the Field shall
include the treatment and prophylaxis of Hepatitis B Virus
infection, and (b) for Product containing EVG or COBI, the
Field shall include any use that is consistent with the label
approved by the FDA or applicable foreign regulatory
54. Medicines Patent Pool/Gilead Licenses, Questions and Answers, MEDICINES
PATENT POOL, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/LICENSING/Current-Licences/
Medicines- Patent-Pool-and-Gilead-Licence-Agreement/Q-and-A-Gilead-Licences (last
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authority for the use of such Product containing EVG or
COBI 9
This definition allows sublicensees a wide range of uses for the
products beyond HIV, including, for example, for the treatment of
hepatitis B. Thus, patients afflicted by hepatitis B can also benefit
from the MPP/Gilead license. Permitting sublicensees to produce
these drugs to treat other diseases can increase the economies of scale
leading to a reduction of price for these medicines. The expanded
field of use therefore represents a positive aspect of the licensing
agreement.
Contrary to some expressed concerns regarding the field of use
provisions, the license does not endorse patents on new uses60 of the
drugs. The actual language of the agreement does not cover Gilead
patents on new uses and does not imply endorsement of new use
patents. Individual countries, in their sovereignty, continue to
determine the patentability of a specific product. The field of use
license determines the uses that are authorized under the existing
patents. A license limited to the treatment of HIV/AIDS is useful, but
broader fields of use carry even greater value because they permit
generic versions of the drug to benefit patients in developing
countries that suffer from diseases other than HIV/AIDS.
3. Geographic Coverage
These licenses, which cover up to 112 countries, represent the
largest geographical scope of any voluntary license to date by a
private company. In total, well over 26 million persons living with
HIV/AIDS are covered by the most encompassing license, and over
25 million persons living with HIV/AIDS for the most restrictive
geographic scope of these licenses.6
Gilead previously offered voluntary licenses on TDF in ninety-
five low- and middle-income countries. The new license on TDF
expands the geographic scope to cover an additional seventeen
59. Main Gilead Licensing Agreement, supra note 45, at art. I (emphasis in original).
60. "New use" patents is a mechanism where companies try to renew their
monopolies by seeking a new patent over a known substance. It is a way to enjoy a longer
monopoly, permitting companies to charge high prices for a longer period of time on the
same product. Even though a new substance has not been created or invented, companies
often seek such patents to prolong their monopolies in a process known as "evergreening."
61. James Love, Coverage of Persons Living with HIV in Gilead MPP Licenses (Oct.
13, 2011), KEI, http://keionline.org/node/1295 (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
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countries, for a total of 112. 62 This expansion of geographic scope
over the previous licenses provides additional coverage to roughly
93,200 persons living with HIV/AIDS.63 One hundred percent of low-
income countries are included in the TDF license, which also covers
approximately ninety-six percent of those living in lower middle-
income countries and sixty-seven percent of those in upper middle-
income countries. 6 Ultimately, the TDF license to the MPP covers
approximately eighty-four percent of persons living with HIV/AIDS
and ninety percent of those living in low- and middle-income
countries.
The COBI license covers a slightly smaller geographic scope,
including 103 countries.6 ' Like the TDF license, all low-income
countries are included in the license. Additionally, 92.8 percent of
those living with HIV/AIDS in lower middle-income countries and
56.4 percent of upper middle-income countries are covered by the
COBI license, translating to coverage of eighty percent of persons
living with HIV/AIDS, eighty-five percent of those in low- and
middle-income countries. 66
62. Main Gilead Licensing Agreement, supra note 45 at, app. 1. The new countries
included in the TDF license include: Anguilla, Armenia, Aruba, British Virgin Islands,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Montserrat, Nauru, Palau, South Sudan,
Sri Lanka, Tonga, Turkmenistan, and Turks & Caicos. It should be noted that this count
includes South Sudan, a newly recognized country.
63. This figure represents the additional territories beyond the prior Gilead licenses
on TDF and is based on 2009 data reported by the World Health Organization (in 2010)
on the total number of persons living with HIV in these countries. Some critics of the
license have cited much smaller figures (of approximately 14,000-15,000) which represent
the number of persons living with HIV in these countries that are currently on
antiretroviral treatment. The number throughout this article refer to the total number of
persons that the licenses could benefit, that is, the total population covered by the licenses.
There are certainly numerous people in both developed and developing countries who are
not currently receiving HIV/AIDS treatment, but should be. The new countries covered
by the MPP/Gilead license with significant HIV-positive patients include Ecuador
(37,000), El Salvador (34,000) and Kazakhstan (13,000).
64. Although the vast majority of countries in the MPP/Gilead license are low- or
middle-income countries, five high-income countries are also included in the TDF license:
Aruba, Bahamas, Equatorial Guinea, Trinidad & Tobago, and Turks & Caicos. Main
Gilead Licensing Agreement, supra note 45, at Appendix 1: Countries in the TDF
Territory. Note that South Sudan was recognized as a country after the signing of these
licenses. South Sudan is covered by the license, but not listed on the appendices to the
license agreement originally signed between MPP and Gilead. Amendment adding South
Sudan to Medicines Patent Pool Licensing Agreement with Gilead Sciences (July 15,
2011), http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/content/download/505/2987/version/l/file/
Signed+amendment+adding+South+Sudan.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2011).
65. Main Gilead Licensing Agreement, supra note 45, at app. 4.
66. MPP/Gilead Q&A, supra note 54, at question 14.
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EVG and the quad licenses include 100 countries 67 and, like the
other licenses to the MPP, cover all low-income countries. The
geographic scope of the EVG and quad licenses is very similar to that
for COBI, but excludes three additional countries: Aruba (classified
as a high-income country by the World Bank), the Dominican
Republic, and Montserrat. 68 The exclusion of these three countries for
EVG and the quad means that more than fifty-five percent of persons
living with HIV/AIDS in upper middle-income countries are covered
by these licenses.
The exclusion of a number of middle-income countries,
particularly those in Asia and Latin America, represents one of the
main 69 criticisms of the MPP/Gilead license. The expansion of
67. Main Gilead Licensing Agreement, supra note 45, at app. 4. Excluded countries
from the COBI license include: Botswana, Ecuador, El Salvador, Indonesia Kazakhstan,
Namibia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Turkmenistan; see also Stakeholder Briefing by Gilead
Sciences, New York, NY (Aug. 23, 2011). Outside of the MPP, Gilead entered into
voluntary licensing agreements for COBI, EVG and the quad with four Indian generic
manufacturing partners for these nine countries. These "semi-exclusive" licenses include a
higher royalty rate than the MPP licenses (ten percent royalty for the quad and fifteen
percent royalty for individual products while royalties on pediatric formulations are
waived) and have confidential terms requiring "progress" to be shown by the four generic
partners on developing pediatric formulations. During a stakeholder briefing delivered by
Gilead on August 23, 2011, Gregg Alton stated that these countries were selected for the
semi-exclusive license because they tend to be wealthier countries than others in the
license or, for the lower income countries such as Sri Lanka, contained a small HIV
prevalence.
68. Compare Main Gilead Licensing Agreement, supra note 45, Appendix 4:
Countries in the COBI Territory with Main Gilead Licensing Agreement, supra note 45,
Appendix 5: Countries in the EVG-Quad Territory.
69. The geographic scope and exclusion of certain countries is a section that was
almost universally criticized by civil society. Oxfarn welcomes Gilead's historic decision to
make HIV drugs accessible to poor, Oxfam (July 12, 2011), http://www.oxfam.org.uk/
applications/blogs/pressoffice/201 1/07/1 2/oxfam-welcomes-gilead % E2 %80%99s-h istoric-
decision-to-make-hiv-drugs-accessible-to-poor/?v=media; Gilead license expands access,
but several countries left out, MSF (July 12, 2011), http://msf.org/msf/articles/2011/07/
gilead-licence-expands-access-but-several-countries-left-out.cfm; KEI Comment on the
Medicines Patent Pool license with Gilead, KEI (July 12, 2011), http://keionline.org/
node/1184; International Treatment Preparedness Coalition (ITPC) and Initiative for
Medicines, Access and Knowledge (I-MAK), The Implications of the Medicines Patent
Pool and Gilead Licenses on Access to Treatment: Briefing Paper (July 25, 2011), available
at http://www.i-mak.org/storage/ITPC%20I-MAK%20-%2OThe%20Broader%20
Implications%2Oof%20the%20MPP%20and%2OGilead%2OLicenses%20on%20Access
%20-%20FINAL%2025-7-201 1.pdf.; Brook Baker, Inside Views: Corporate Self-Interest
and Strategic Choices: Gilead Licenses to the Medicines Patent Pool, IP WATCH (July 21,
2011), http://www.ip-watch.org/2011/07/21/corporate-self-interest-and-strategic-choices-
gilead-licenses-to-medicines-patent-pool/; Open Letter from Thai Civil Soc'y (July 21,
2011), http://www.patentes.org.br/sulsul/media/file/Open%20Letter%20from %20
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geographic scope in future licenses would be a welcome improvement
and is an area where progress can be clearly measured and
monitored.
In sum, for all the products covered by the MPP/Gilead licenses,
all low-income countries and nearly all lower middle-income
countries are included. Although room for improvement with respect
to geographic coverage exists, the majority of low and middle-income
countries are covered. In terms of persons living with HIV/AIDS,
approximately twenty-five million persons directly benefit from the
licenses, representing a significant portion of the HIV-positive
population; half a million persons living in developing countries are
excluded from the licensed territory.
Negotiations, particularly ones entered into voluntarily, involve a
balancing between competing objectives and improvements in one
area may result in less favorable provisions in other sections of the
agreement. To expand the geographic scope, it may be necessary to
consider changes in other terms of the license or new incentives for
companies to provide more extensive geographic coverage.70
4. Sourcing of active pharmaceutical ingredients
One of the limitations of the license permits sourcing of active
pharmaceutical ingredients (API) exclusively from India.7' The
agreement defines "Licensed API Supplier" as "an entity (other than
the applicable Sublicensee) that is licensed by Gilead or sublicensed
by MPFF under a sublicense Agreement, to manufacture and sell API
to third parties in the Field in India.""2 The licensing agreement
between the MPP and Gilead states:
Article 2.1 Sublicense Agreements. The parties intend that MPP
will identify potential manufacturers of generic pharmaceutical
products located in India (collectively "Manufacturers") and, once
identified, MPP shall have the right to execute (together with Gilead)
a sublicense agreement with each such Manufacturer pursuant to
which MPP shall grant such Manufacturer a sublicense under the
Thai%20organizations.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2012); Open Letter from the Latin-
American Civil Soc'y Grps. (July 20,2011).
70. Other concessions may also be involved in order to improve some areas of the
agreement, such as the expansion of the geographic coverage.
71. See Main Gilead Licensing Agreement, supra note 45, at art. 2.1.
72. Id. at art. 1: Definitions.
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rights granted to MPP in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 according to the Form
Sublicense Agreement."
The terms of the agreement thus restricts the sourcing of API
and the manufacture of the licensed products to India. The agreement
does not permit the sale of API to non-licensees.
The limitation on API sourcing and manufacture of the licensed
products is another area with room for improvement and has been
widely criticized by public health groups. Although the Gilead/MPP
agreement offers a non-exclusive license within India, it restricts
competition to one country and prohibits domestic manufacture. 4
While Gilead has indicated a willingness to consider modifications to
the agreement, for example, to permit the manufacturer of products
in a particular country outside of India, it has generally not accepted
proposals to permit manufacturing in any country and this area
remains controversial.
5. Royalties
The license agreement currently requires sublicensees to pay
royalties to Gilead in the amount of three percent of its sales of
generic TDF produced under the agreement. 5 For COBI, EVG and
the quad, a five-percent royalty applies. 6 Gilead has waived its
royalties on pediatric formulations of the licensed product.7
73. Id. at art. 2.1.
74. Permitting domestic manufacture could help strengthen development and
encourage local capacity building. The Declaration on the Right to Development art. 8,
A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986) ("States should undertake at the national level, all necessary
measures for the realization of the right to development and shall ensure, inter alia,
equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health services,
food, housing, employment and distribution of income. Effective measures should be
undertaken to ensure that women have an active role in the development process.
Appropriate economic and social reforms should be carried out with a view to eradicating
all social injustices.").
75. Form Gilead Sublicense Agreement, supra note 51, at art. 4.1(a)-(c). The royalties
are currently set at three percent. However, should TDF receive patent protection in
India, those royalties will be increased to five percent. The patent landscape of TDF in
India is murky at the moment. No patent on TDF currently exists in India, however
Gilead has appealed the rejection of this patent and is pursuing patent protection for this
drug.
76. Id. at art. 4.1(d)-(g).
77. Id. at art. 4.1(h) and 6.2(3)(i)-(ii). Sublicensees have the right to develop pediatric
formulations for patients under the age of twelve. It should be noted that for EVG and
EVG combination products, Gilead's prior written consent is necessary for the
development of pediatric formulations, such consent "not to be unreasonably withheld."
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The license restricts the manufacture of the products to India
and, as a result, royalties must be paid in the licensed territories, even
when the products are exported to a licensed territory for which no
patents exist for the drugs, a result that has been widely criticized by
health groups."8 While many of Gilead's products do not receive
patent protection in the majority of the territories covered by the
MPP agreement, the patent status of these products in the country of
sale or use represents only half of the equation; patents in the country
of manufacture represents the other consideration. By applying for
patents in India and limiting API sourcing and production to India,
Gilead effectively created a system requiring the payment of royalties
because patents exist or remain pending in the country of
manufacture and export.
Of the royalties owed to Gilead, the agreement reserves a small
brokers fee for the MPP.7 9 Gilead has agreed to pay the MPP five
percent of all sublicense revenue received, up to a maximum of $1
million per calendar year." This figure translates to between 0.15 and
0.25 percent of the total sale revenues, a marginal amount."
6. Termination Provisions
Under the MPP/Gilead license, sublicensees can terminate the
licenses at any time. The licenses on the products are severable or
"unbundled," meaning that sublicensees have the ability to take a
license on all products or just some. Sections 10.4n and 10.5 of the
78. International Treatment Preparedness Coalition, Concerns About the Process,
Principles of the Medicines Patent Pool and the License, PETITIONBUZZ.COM (Oct. 10,
2011), https://www.petitionbuzz.com/petitions/mppunitaid (last visited Dec. 6, 2011).
79. Main Gilead Licensing Agreement, supra note 45, at art. 3.1.
80. Id.
81. Despite the fact that the MPP estimates that these revenues will only amount to
approximately $10,000 over the next four years, which represents less than one percent of
the MPP's operating budget, some concerns have been raised as to whether this broker's
fee presents a conflict of interest. It is the opinion of the Author that such a small broker's
fee does not, inherently, present a conflict of interest. Furthermore, as a matter of
practicality, as well as being a directive from the UNITAID Board, the MPP should
consider avenues for financial sustainability beyond dependency on UNITAID. Due to
controversies raised about the potential for, or the appearance of, conflicts of interest,
however, the MPP has stated that it would consider waiving its broker's fee. See Response
to Questions & Comments to Medicines Patent Pool-Gilead Licenses, MEDICINES PATENT
POOL, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/LICENSING/Current-Licences/Medicines-
Patent-Pool-and-Gilead-Licence-Agreement/Response-to-Feedback (last visited Dec. 6,
2011).
82. Form Gilead Sublicense Agreement, supra note 51, at art. 10.4 provides that
licensees have the right to terminate the agreement in its entirety upon thirty days prior
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MPP/Gilead license agreement explicitly provide that sublicensees
have the right "at its sole discretion, to terminate the licenses ... with
respect to any particular API, at any time."83 The termination
becomes effective immediately upon the receipt of written notice
from the sublicensee to Gilead and the MPP.8 Termination of the
license on one product does not affect the license for any other API
or product.85
The unbundling provisions represent a significant flexibility for
sublicensees to select only the products they wish to produce or the
ones where they believe patents stand as a barrier to the manufacture
and sale of the drug. Thus, where the patent landscape is not clear or
where it appears that a patent does not exist or will not be granted,
such as for Gilead's drug TDF, sublicensees are free to terminate the
license on that product.
In fact, when the MPP announced that two Indian generic
manufacturing companies had signed sublicense agreements, one
company, Aurobindo, elected to only take licenses on COBI, EVG,
FIC,s6 and the quad. 7 Immediately upon signing its sublicense,
written notice to both Gilead and MPP. Article 10.5 governs the termination of licenses on
an API basis.
83. Id. at art.10.5. I note that some criticisms have pointed out that sublicensees must
sign the license in its entirety, then terminate its licenses on the specific API for which it
does not wish to take a license. These critics suggest that a better model for the license
would be create four individual licenses and sublicensees could then select the licenses to
sign, rather than the licenses to terminate. As a practical matter, however, this distinction
does not carry a difference and the effect will likely be that generic companies will elect to
terminate the TDF license while retaining their licenses on the other products unless India
grants Gilead's application for a patent on TDF.
84. Id. at art. 10.5.
85. Id. at art. 10.5(c).
86. One criticism of the MPP/Gilead license suggests that termination of the TDF
license also terminates a sublicensee's ability to produce IFTC, as well. However, as
evidenced by Aurobindo's actions, termination of TDF does not impact rights granted
under the license with regard to FTFC. The severability of the license on one API leaves
the remainder of the license intact. Article 5.3 of the MPP/Gilead license's covenant not to
sue states that "Gilead covenants and agrees that it shall not, at any time during the term
of this Agreement, bring any claim or proceeding of any kind or nature against MPP in
relation to any of the pending and issued patents identified in Appendix 3 hereto (the
"Emtricitabine Patents") to the extent that MPP remains in compliance with the terms
and conditions set forth in this Agreement and each Sublicense Agreement." Nothing in
the agreement ties the covenant not to sue on FTC to the TDF license. The MPP/Gilead
license should still permit a sublicensee with a valid agreement on other products, such as
COBI, EVG or the quad, to produce FTC. Because of this perceived ambiguity and
complaint by civil society organizations, on November 14, 2011, Gilead and the MPP
amended the license agreement to clarify that where a licensee terminates its TDF license,
Gilead "shall not during the term of this Agreement, bring a claim or proceeding of any
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Aurobindo took advantage of the unbundling provision and notified
Gilead of its intent to terminate the license for TDF.8 As a result,
Aurobindo can sell TDF to countries outside of the territory without
paying royalties, provided that patent barriers do not exist in those
countries.8 9
Many of the criticisms surrounding the MPP/Gilead license are
aimed at the TDF license. One criticism is the fact that TDF does not
currently receive patent protection in India. As a practical matter,
however, the fact that the licenses are unbundled makes many of the
criticisms' moot. For example, because TDF does not receive patent
protection in the vast majority of countries in the licensed territory
and is also not currently patented in India, sublicensees terminating
kind against Licensee in relation to the Emtricitabine Patents with respect to Licensee's
manufacture, use or sale of Products that incorporate TDF and FTC as active
pharmaceutical ingredients (such Products, "TDF/FTC Products") in the TDF Territory.
For clarity, upon a TDF Termination, nothing set forth in this Section 7.5 shall be
interpreted to prevent Gilead from enforcing any right, title or interest in any of its
proprietary rights covering TDF (including the TDF Patents) against Licensee with
respect to its activities related to TDF/FTC Products in the TDF Territory, or from
enforcing any right, title or interest in any of its proprietary rights covering FTC (including
the Emtricitabine Patents) against Licensee with respect to its activities related to
TDF/FTC Products outside the TDF Territory." Second Amendment to Gilead License
Agreement, MEDICINES PATENT POOL, (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.medicinespatentpool.
org/content/down load/597/3420/version/l /file/MPP+Secon d+Amendment+ %28fully+
executed%29.pdf [hereinafter Second Amendment to Gilead License Agreement].
87. Generic Companies Join the Medicines Patent Pool: Aurobindo signs on to
increase access to medicines around the world, MEDICINES PATENT POOL (Oct 11, 2011),
http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/NEWS-ROOM/News-from-the-Pool/Generics-Join-
the-Pool.
88. Letter from Aurobindo to Gilead, Sub: Termination Notice for Tenofovir (Sep.
20, 2011), available at http://editor.nel6.com/medicines-patent-pool/aurobindo-fully
executed2.pdf. As Gilead clarified in the amended license, termination of the TDF license
does not affect Aurobindo's (or other sublicensees') ability to produce FTC and the
TDF/FTC combination. See infra note 89 and accompanying notes.
89. According to the MPP's patent status database, The Patent Status Database for
Selected HIV Medicines, MEDICINESPATENTPOOL, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/
LICENSING/Patent-Status-of-ARVs, several countries may purchase TDF from
Aurobindo as patents on this drug do not exist in: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, Ukraine, and Uruguay.
90. Such as the assertion that the MPP/Gilead license introduces a "global patent
system" and permits Gilead to receive royalties on TDF "until every possible legal avenue
is exhausted." International Treatment Preparedness Coalition (ITPC) and Initiative for
Medicines, Access and Knowledge (I-MAK), The Implications of the Medicines Patent
Pool and Gilead Licenses on Access to Treatment: Briefing Paper (July 25, 2011), available
at http://www.i-mak.org/storage/ITPC%201MAK%20%2OThe%20Broader%20
Implications%20of%20the%20M PP%20and%2OGilead%2OLicenses%20on %20Access
%20-%20FINAL%2025-7-2011 .pdf [hereinafter ITPC/I-MAK Briefing Paper].
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the TDF license can manufacture and export to those countries
without royalties.
7. Ability to Supply to Countries Outside the Licensed Territory
Although a number of middle-income countries were excluded
from the licensed territory, the agreement explicitly permits
sublicensees to produce the licensed products for use in excluded
countries that have issued a compulsory license. Section 10.3(d) of the
agreement states:
For further clarity, and notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in this Agreement, it shall not be deemed to be a
breach of the Agreement for Licensee to supply an API or
Product outside the Territory into a county where (i) the
government of such country has issued a compulsory license
relating to such API or Product allowing for the importation of
such API or Product into such country, provided Licensee's
supply of Product or API into such country is solely within the
scope and geographic range of such compulsory license and
only for the duration that such compulsory license is in effect
and/or (ii) the Government of India has issued a compulsory
license allowing for the export of any API or Product from
India and into such country, provided that (Y) there are no
patents controlled by Gilead that contain a valid claim covering
the use, import offer for sale or sale of such API or such
Product issued in such country or a compulsory license has also
been issued by the relevant authorities of such country and (Z)
Licensee's supply of Product or API into such country is solely
within the scope and geographic range of the compulsory
license issued by the Government of India and only for the
duration that such compulsory license is in effect.9"
91. Second Amendment to Gilead License Agreement, supra note 86. The original
license contained different language for the final clause (Z) and previously read "(Z)
Licensee and Gilead are in agreement (with such agreement not to be unreasonably
withheld) regarding the existence, scope and content of such compulsory license." Clause
Z had initially operated as a notification requirement, requiring the Licensee to notify
Gilead that a compulsory license existed. Although it was a notification requirement and
did not give Gilead the right to veto or approve of the existence of such a compulsory
license-states, in their sovereignty have the right to issue compulsory licenses, an
important TRIPS flexibility that can be used to protect the public health-some civil
society groups criticized this portion of the license and argued that Gilead must give its
permission for Licensees to operate under a compulsory license. See ITPC/I-MAK
Briefing Paper, supra note 90. It does not appear that the intention of the parties was for
Gilead to have veto power over a compulsory license and on November 14, 2011, Gilead
and the MPP amended the license to clarify the rights regarding compulsory licenses.
Clause (Z) now removes any mention of Gilead and simply clarifies that supplying under a
compulsory license must be within the scope and geographic range of the compulsory
license and during the time such license is in effect.
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This provision thus permits sublicensees to export to countries
outside of the licensed territory using the following two mechanisms.
First, under 10.3(d)(i) of the compulsory licensing provision,
sublicensees may export the licensed products to a country excluded
from the territories of this license where a patent exists in that
country and the government issues a compulsory license. An export
license from India does not appear to be required in such cases.
Second, where patents do not exist in a particular country of
import or use for the licensed products, the government may issue a
notification to India for import of the products and the Government
of India could then issue a compulsory license allowing for the export
of the product, through an application of 10.3(d)(ii). This second
outcome-which, from a survey of the current patent landscape for
Gilead's patents seems to be the mechanism that will be used with
greater frequency-is made possible through Section 92A of the
Indian Patents Act' which provides for compulsory licenses for
export to countries with insufficient or non-existent manufacturing
capacity. The plain language of section 92A requires the Controller to
grant a compulsory license for export upon notification by a country
of insufficient manufacturing capacity. 93 Countries excluded from the
MPP/Gilead license are therefore still able to benefit from the
licenses.
As will be discussed in further detail in Part IV.B, infra, the
compulsory licensing provision of the MPP/Gilead license is an
important one and countries should take advantage of this flexibility
92. The Patents Act, No. 39, Section 92A (as amended by Patents (Amdt.) Act. 2005)
("(1) Compulsory license shall be available for manufacture and export of patented
pharmaceutical products to any country having insufficient or no manufacturing capacity
in the pharmaceutical sector for the concerned product to address public health problems,
provided compulsory license has been granted by such country or such country has, by
notification or otherwise, allowed importation of the patented pharmaceutical products
from India. (2) The Controller shall, on receipt of an application in the prescribed manner,
grant a compulsory license solely for manufacture and export of the concerned
pharmaceutical product to such country under such terms and conditions as may be
specified and published by him. (3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be
without prejudice to the extent to which pharmaceutical products produced under a
compulsory license can be exported under any other provision of this Act. Explanation-
For the purposes of this section, "pharmaceutical products" means any patented product,
or product manufactured through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed
to address public health problems and shall be inclusive of ingredients necessary for their
manufacture and diagnostic kits required for their use.").
93. No binding precedent has interpreted Section 92A of the Indian Patents Act.
Accordingly, it is unclear whether 92A would require the notification requirements under
the Paragraph 6 mechanism of the Doha Declaration and the August 30 TRIPS Decision.
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to protect their patients and to place additional pressure on private
pharmaceutical companies to expand the licensed territories.
8. Grant Back Provisions
Article 2.3 of the agreement requires licensees to grant back
improvements related to the licensed technology:
License Grant to Gilead. Licensee hereby grants to Gilead a
nonexclusive, royalty-free, worldwide, sublicensable license to
all improvements, methods, modifications and other know-how
developed by or on behalf of Licensee and relating to API or a
Product ("Improvements"), subject to the restrictions on
further transfer of Licensee's technology by Gilead as set forth
in Section 5.2.9'
This grant-back is non-exclusive, meaning that the sublicensee is
free to license its improvements to other manufacturers. Additionally,
the improvements subject to the grant-back provision are limited to
those made prior to any termination of a license on the product and
the transfer of know-how would be completed at Gilead's expense.
95
Here, Gilead has obtained a freedom to operate with respect to
improvements related to the products it licensed to the MPP. It is
important to note that Gilead did not receive a right to ownership of
any the improvements, but rather, negotiated only a right for its own
use. Only the developer of the improvement would have the right to
license or share the improvements with third parties or to patent the
improvements.96
Three main categories of grant-back provisions exist:97 non-exclusive grant-backs, 9 "assignment" provisions, 9 and exclusive"°
94. Form Gilead Sublicense Agreement, supra note 51, at art. 2.3.
95. Id. at art. 5.2.
96. See id. at art. 5.2 governing reporting requirements of improvements and stating
that "Licensee shall provide Gilead with an annual report, in writing and in reasonable
detail that sets forth any Improvements, including any patent applications claiming
Improvements." (emphasis added).
97. David J. Dykeman, Licensing Technology: When Licensing Out Patents, Make
Sure Improvements Are Granted Back (Mar. 6, 2006), http://www.masshightech.com/
stories/2006/03/06/focus2-When-licensing-out-patents-make-sure-improvements-are-
granted-back.html.
98. Id. (Non-exclusive grant backs "allow the licensor to practice the improvement,
while the licensee retains title and all other rights. Non-exclusive grant backs may be with
or without royalty. A royalty-free, fully paid up, non-exclusive license grant back protects
against a licensee filing improvement patents on its own.").
99. Id. (Assignment grant backs require the licensee to assign any improvements back
to the licensor. As Dykeman notes, "Assignment grant back provisions are unpopular with
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grant-backs.'0 ' The first category, non-exclusive grant backs, such as
the one contained in the MPP/Gilead licensing agreement, represent
the "most common approach because it is acceptable to licensees and
is generally legally permissible."'0'2 Ultimately, this clause protects
Gilead's interests while still promoting competition, unlike the other
two categories of grant-backs.
9. Licensees free to challenge patents
Significantly, the MPP/Gilead agreement leaves space to utilize
other strategies, in conjunction with the existing licenses, to improve
access to medicines. The licensing agreement does not contain "no
challenge" provisions, meaning that sublicensees are free to challenge
the patent validity of Gilead's patents. The agreement does not block
any system of pre- or post-grant opposition, nor does it create any
legal barriers to challenging spurious patents. Like many of the
provisions detailed, supra, the absence of a "no-challenge clause"
provides licensees with significant and positive flexibilities.
D. Evaluation of the Medicines Patent Pool
on the Basis of Current Licenses
Any evaluation of the resulting licenses must take into
consideration the fact that companies negotiating with the MPP do so
voluntarily. Thus, a private pharmaceutical company is free to walk
away from the negotiating table without issuing any licenses on its
life-saving medicines. In any negotiation, unless one party has all the
bargaining power while the other side has none, common sense
dictates that the terms will involve trade-offs with each side giving up
the terms it wants in some areas, while achieving the outcomes it has
sought in others. This reality is magnified in a situation, such as here,
where the negotiations occur through pure voluntary actions.
licensees and may require a lower royalty on the original license in exchange for the
licensee relinquishing ownership of its future improvements.").
100. Id. (These provisions "provide the licensor an exclusive right to use or sublicense
any patented improvements, while the licensee retains only a non-exclusive right to
practice the patented improvements.").
101. Id. ("Legal concerns of grant backs: Antitrust concerns have been raised about
assignment or exclusive grant backs as being anticompetitive for inhibiting innovation. For
this reason, grant back provisions have often met resistance within the pharmaceutical
industry, particularly with discoveries made using research tools. The stronger argument is
that grant backs foster competition by allowing the licensor and licensee to share the risks
and rewards of innovation. Non-exclusive grant backs are virtually always competitive and
unlikely to raise antitrust concerns.").
102. Id.
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With these dynamics in mind, several considerations exist for
evaluating the success of the MPP and the effectiveness of the licenses
it has negotiated. Although public health activists may have ideal
licensing terms in mind, realistically the MPP will not be able to
achieve the "perfect" license without a change in structure providing
the MPP with additional leverage in the negotiations. An all or
nothing mentality with regard to these licenses'0 3 will likely result in
nothing and the impacts on the millions of persons living with
HIV/AIDS must be considered before rejecting the licenses in their
entirety.9O
When evaluating the licenses, critics should consider the
geographic scope and number or percentage of persons covered by
the agreement, particularly as compared to other voluntary licensing
agreements.'5 As noted in Part III.C, supra, the MPP/Gilead license
has the largest geographic scope of any voluntary license to date and
is clearly an improvement on this basis. The expanded TDF license
covers an additional estimated 93,200 additional persons living with
HIV/AIDS as compared with the previous Gilead license on TDF.
While room for improvement exists with regard to geographic scope,
the current MPP/Gilead license already represents an improvement
over the prior TDF license.
In addition to the expanded number of patients covered by the
MPP licenses, new provisions exist explicitly permitting generic drug
companies receiving the MPP licenses to operate outside of the
voluntary license, under compulsory licenses, without breaching the
voluntary license. The language on compulsory licenses contained
within the MPP license ensures that countries excluded from the
geographic scope of the voluntary license can still benefit through
threats of, or actually granting, compulsory licenses and importing the
products from sublicensees of the voluntary licenses. This possibility
did not exist in the prior TDF licenses.
103. For example, suggesting that the MPP reject the license unless all low- and
middle-income countries are included.
104. One analogy presented during the civil-society pre-meeting in advance of the
UNITAID 3rd Consultative Forum is whether a starving person begging for a full loaf of
bread who is then offered only a half a loaf should reject the half loaf in its entirety or
accept it, then return and ask for more.
105. Unfortunately, other voluntary licensing agreements are often kept secret with
regard to their terms. It is difficult to evaluate the MPP licenses against other voluntary
license agreements because, while the MPP takes steps forward to improve transparency




. In addition to the expanded geographic coverage on TDF,
Gilead also provided licenses for its pipeline products. This portion of
the agreement represents a strong step forward for public health
because patients in developing countries often do not have early
access to newer medicines.
Additionally, the MPP/Gilead license supports innovation for
pediatric formulations by waiving any royalties on such products.
While access to affordable medicines is certainly an important aspect
in promoting public health, innovations for new treatments, such as
fixed dose combinations and pediatric formulations, are also critical.
Any evaluation of the MPP/Gilead license should acknowledge this
provision as a positive outcome of the negotiations.
IV. Carrots and Sticks: Using All Available Tools to
Enhance Voluntary Licensing Agreements
In order to rectify the identified problems and enhance voluntary
licenses through expansions of both product coverage and geographic
scope, it will be helpful to find ways that provide the MPP additional
leverage during current and future negotiations. Such leverage may
be offered by providing private industry with additional incentives to
license its products to the MPP, or through evidence that excluding
particular countries from the agreements would not serve the
interests of the company.
A. Donor Prize Fund
One of the biggest critiques of the MPP license with Gilead
centers around the middle-income countries left out of the
agreement.' 6 Although the MPP/Gilead license represents the largest
geographic scope of any voluntary license to date, a number of
106. See Mddecins Sans Fronti~res Access, MSF Review of the July 2011 Gilead
Licences to the Medicines Patent Pool, MSFACCESS.ORG, 8 (Dec. 2011), http://www.
msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/MSF-assets/HIV-AIDS/Docs/AIDS-Briefing--GileadLice
nceReviewENG_2011.pdf ("The exclusion of some lower middle- and middle-income
countries (including China, Thailand, Argentina, Peru, Egypt, and Ukraine) disappointed
patient groups in these countries, who were hopeful that these VL negotiations would
bring an end to their struggle to increase access to Gilead's products .... "); Thai Network
of People living with HIV/AIDS (TNP+), Open Letter from Thai Civil Society -21/07/2011,
PATENTES.ORG.BR, 1, http://www.patentes.org.br/sulsul/media/file/Open%20Letter%20
from %20Thai%20organizations.pdf ("bad news for millions of people living with HIV in
the low and middle income countries excluded from the benefits of the Patent Pool");
MPP/Gilead Q&A, supra note 54, at question 14 ("The Pool acknowledges that the
geographical scope of the license is a critical area where it needs to be improved."); see
also note 67, supra and accompanying notes.
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middle-income countries, particularly those that are upper middle-
income were not included in the license. In these countries, the
licensed products are unavailable unless the government issued a
compulsory license. In order to expand geographic coverage and
induce new licenses with better terms, additional incentives (aside
from the marginal public relations boost in media a company might
receive) are necessary. Although a broad range of incentives may
improve the landscape for the MPP, one particular proposal put forth
by the governments of Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia and Suriname
in 20091°0 to the World Health Organization 8 deserves consideration
as a compliment to the MPP.)' This proposal, titled "Prize Fund to
Support Innovation and Access for Donor Supported Markets for
HIV/AIDS" (hereinafter "Donor Prize Fund"), would create a model
that would support an innovation agenda while also de-linking
product prices from the cost of innovation through a prize system.
The Donor " ' Prize Fund would create a reward system for
research and development that would be linked to voluntary licenses
107. The 2009 proposal was based on an earlier proposal presented by the Bolivian
government in March 2008 during the WHO Intergovernmental Working Group on Public
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property. See Proposal By Bolivia: Plan of Action
IGWG II (bis) (Mar. 2008), http://www.who.int/entity/phi/submissions/ENBoliviaConf
Paperl.pdf.
108. Proposal by Barbados, Bolivia, Suriname and Bangladesh, a Prize Fund to
Support Innovation and Access for Donor Supported Markets: Linking Rewards for
Innovation to the Competitive Supply of Products for HIV-AIDS, TB, Malaria and Other
Diseases for Humanitarian Use (Apr. 15, 2009), http:llwww.who.intlentity/phi/Bangladesh-
BarbadosBoliviaSurinameDonorPrize.pdf [hereinafter Donor Prize Fund Proposal].
109. One of the recommendations that emerged from the UNITAID 3rd Consultative
Expert Working Group was that UNITAID should "[c]onduct a study of all possible
options that would expand geographic scope and increase product coverage for the
Medicines Patent Pool including, but not limited to, the Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia
and Suriname donor prize fund proposal, a submission being considered by the WHO
CEWG and WIPO's Development Agenda project on open collaborative models.
UNITAID should evaluate and identify ways to incentivize participation in the Medicines
Patent Pool." Intellectual Property Workshop Recommendations, UNITAID 3rd
Consultative Forum, slide 6 (Oct.5, 2011) available at http://www.unitaid.eu/images/
CFinfo/CFl 1/presentations/ip-workshop-recommendations.pdf.
110. Donors, such as the Global Fund, UNITAID, PEPFAR and others play a critical
role in supporting access to life-saving medications, but their support depends on low
treatment costs in order to adequately serve the millions of persons living with diseases
such as HIV/AIDS. Because drug developers often refuse to license their patents to
generic competitors and charge high monopoly prices for their products, the costs of these
treatments could prove unsustainable in the long-run. Even domestically in the United
States, the cost of HIV/AIDS drugs is so high that many state AIDS Drug Assistance
Programs (ADAPs) are in crisis, with thousands of persons on waitlists for treatment.
Globally, the rise of donor funding has, in some cases, encouraged greater patenting of
products in developing countries, resulting in higher prices and reduced ability to provide
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on the resulting products."' Funding would come from a fraction of
donor drug purchasing budgets, such as from the Global Fund,
UNITAID or the U.S.-supported PEPFAR program, and used to
reward the voluntary licensing of products to the MPP."2 Innovators
could apply for a share of the fund, but the Donor Prize Fund would
condition any reward on the patent holder providing an open license
in all developing countries, permitting generic competition.'13
Requiring the inclusion of all developing countries ensures a
sufficiently large market for generic products, allowing for economies
of scale that can ultimately lead to lower costs for essential
medicines."4
The Donor Prize Fund would divide rewards between the
eligible patent holders based on "the relative impact of the products
on health outcomes."' 15 Applicants would qualify on the basis of
clinical evidence demonstrating the efficacy of the new product as
compared to prior existing treatment options." 6 The share of the
reward would be proportional to its impact on improving health
treatments, thus rewarding more important products that truly
represent an improvement. The Donor Prize Fund would only award
prizes for the showing of a successful patent or product.
In addition to distributing prizes for final products, the Donor
Prize Fund proposal includes an open source dividend of up to five
percent of prize fund payments for the knowledge or materials used
to ultimately create the successful products, provided that these
materials were licensed on a "royalty free basis for a field of use and
geographic region that is consistent with the field of use and
geographic region covered by the Prize Fund rewards."' 1 7 The right
sufficient treatment to HIV/AIDS patients. As noted in the Donor Prize Fund Proposal,
supra note 108 at 2, "For example, patents were reportedly sought in 38 African countries,
including several least developed countries (LDCs) for the one second generation HIV-
AIDS drug, while an earlier product, developed by the same company before the creation
of the Global Fund or PEPFAR, was patented in zero African countries." This increase in
patenting and resulting higher monopoly prices reduces the value for dollar for donors.
111. ld.atl.
112. Id. The proposal notes that a suggested amount to create the fund would take ten-
percent of all drug purchasing budgets because ten percent would likely create a sizeable
product fund sufficiently large enough to create strong incentives for drug companies.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., UNITAID, Cost Benefit Analysis for UNITAID Patent Pool,
UNITAID/EB8/2008/11/1 (June 2008).
115. Donor Prize Fund Proposal, supra note 108,.at 3.
116. Id.
117. Id. at4.
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owners to peer-reviewed articles who make the full text of supporting
publications available for free from the moment of publication would
also be eligible for a share of the open source dividend, up to ten
percent of the total dividend.' s
This system would work in tandem with the MPP by providing an
incentive for companies to voluntarily license their products119 to the
MPP in return for a portion of the prize fund. Here, unlike the
existing structure, a "carrot" is offered to private industry, in the form
of a monetary reward, in exchange for an open license for all
developing countries. Not only would the donor prize fund potentially
provide adequate incentive for a company to include all low- and
middle-income countries in its geographic scope, but could also
encourage more and better drugs to be licensed to the MPP.
Additional conditions could be placed on receiving a prize from the
fund, such as permitting sublicensees to be located in the developing
world outside of India.
Private companies may be inclined to participate in the prize
fund for a variety of reasons, including the fact that some products
may have limited patent coverage in developing countries and the
prize could represent a source of revenue the companies might not
otherwise receive. Furthermore, depending on the size of the prize,
the reward through the prize fund may be greater than the profit from
sale of the product in the developing country itself where the patents
are subject to compulsory licenses and the innovator may receive only
a reasonable royalty. The patent holder would not have to spend time
or resources to apply for or enforce its patents. Companies making
early contributions to the MPP and early applications for a share of
the prize fund would likely benefit from a smaller number of
competing entries and thus a larger portion of the fund.
Ultimately, the donor prize fund would provide an incentive for
industry to join the medicines patent pool and to create new
medications or tools that would particularly benefit those living in
developing countries. As a result of the award mechanism, which
requires evidence of an improvement over existing treatments, heat
118. Id. at 4-5. Additional information, as well as the specific requirements set forth,
on both the open source dividend and open access publishing is available from the full
proposal submitted by Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia and Suriname.
119. See id. at 3. The license would permit the production of the product, include a
waiver of any exclusive rights to data protection of the product, and a provide technology
transfer of know-how.
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stable formulations or fixed dose combinations may be eligible for a
larger reward.
Recently, proposals have been made to modify the donor prize
fund to a more general HIV/AIDS prize fund. Such modification
would include contributions from governments that fund their own
HIV/AIDS treatment programs.
B. Compulsory Licenses
In addition to a system of rewards to incentivize companies to
join the MPP and expand product and geographic coverage, it will be
important for individual governments, particularly those countries left
out of the MPP/Gilead license, to also place pressure on patent
holders. Governments have a number of tools available and the
coordinated use of all mechanisms is necessary to more fully promote
the right to health.
First, governments should work to enact appropriate TRIPS-
compliant flexibilities and reject pressures to enact TRIPS-plus
measures, such as those faced through bilateral and plurilateral free
trade agreements with developed countries such as the U.S. or E.U.'2 °
States must preserve their rights to use TRIPS flexibilities, but
beyond that, must actually evidence a willingness to exercise these
rights.
One particularly important TRIPS-flexibility for developing
country governments to use, is the issuance of compulsory licenses to
access medicines, including those subject to the MPP. Under the
MPP/Gilead license, sublicensees can supply to countries that have
120. The U.S. and E.U. both seek TRIPS-plus measures in free trade agreements.
Aside from existing trade agreements, the U.S. is currently negotiating a large plurilateral
free trade agreement, known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), with
eight other countries of widely differing development levels: Australia, Brunei, Chile,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Several other countries have also
expressed interest in joining the TPPA, with Canada, Japan and Mexico making formal
approaches. The TPPA is reportedly eventually expected to encompass the entire APEC
region. Leaked copies of U.S. proposals for the intellectual property chapter, available at
http://keionline.org/tpp, illustrate the numerous TRIPS-plus measures proposed. Also of
great concern is the currently negotiated E.U-India free trade agreement, with reports that
the E.U. is seeking TRIPS-plus measures in India that would impact the ability of generic
manufacturers in India to supply generic versions of medicines to the developing world.
See, e.g., Sarah Boseley, Does EU/India free trade agreement spell the end of cheap drugs
for poor countries? Sarah Boseley's Global Health Blog, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/sarah-boseley-global-health/2012/feb/I 0/hiv-infection-
pharmaceuticals-industry. Both agreements are being negotiated in secret making it
extremely difficult for the general public to know and understand how these agreements
will affect them.
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issued a compulsory license for the licensed products, or where the
importing country requests the Government of India to issue an
export license permitting the sale of the drugs to those countries. This
provision is a significant concession in the MPP/Gilead license and, to
the extent governments elect to exercise this right, will result in an
expansion of the current territories.
More generally, developing countries have to demonstrate a
willingness to grant compulsory licenses for patents on any product
that is not licensed voluntarily to the MPP. The possibility of a
government granting a compulsory licenses is an important "stick" to
encourage private pharmaceutical companies to expand geographic
coverage of its products and license additional products to the MPP.
V. Conclusion
The MPP has the potential to improve access to patented life-
saving medicines for the millions of patients suffering from
HIV/AIDS by negotiating licensing agreements with private
companies to permit generic production of these drugs. However, the
MPP is one of many actors in the public health field and all parties
must become more involved in order to maximize the utility of the
current licenses and improve future licenses.
As discussed in the preceding section, individual country
governments must play an active role in protecting its citizens and
residents and ensure access to affordable life-saving treatments.
Under the existing MPP/Gilead license, governments can access the
Gilead licensed products by issuing a compulsory license for those
drugs. By doing so, countries that do issue a compulsory license will
send a strong signal to other pharmaceutical companies that these
countries should be included in the license agreements. Implementing
and using these TRIPS flexibilities will be important to improving the
public health and country governments must resist TRIPS-plus
measures that developed countries, such as the United States or the
European Union, often pressure countries to adopt through free
trade agreements12 or other mechanisms. The use of TRIPS
flexibilities such as compulsory licenses will likely encourage the
expansion of the geographic scope for future licenses as companies
may prefer the certainty of the royalty payments negotiated with the
MPP than the royalty paid on compulsory licenses.
121. Id. See also Sanya Reid Smith, "TRIPS Plus" Bilateral Agreements - A Threat to
Public Health, THIRD WORLD RESURGENCE, December 2006, available at
http://twnside.org.sg/title2/twr196.htm.
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Civil society can also play a significant part in improving MPP
licenses. In addition to voicing concerns about the existing licenses,
civil society should move to putting additional pressure on
pharmaceutical companies, including Gilead. Civil society can
pressure Gilead in the hopes of expanding the geographic scope or
persuading the company that permitting manufacture outside of India
would be beneficial. Additionally, civil society should pressure
companies currently in negotiations with the MPP to conclude
negotiations and license their products to the pool, while pressuring
companies that are not currently negotiating, to join the pool.
122
In addition to the measures that available in the existing
landscape, new mechanisms and incentives should be explored to
encourage companies to enter into voluntary licensing agreements
with the MPP. The donor prize fund presents one potential incentive
mechanism that could encourage pharmaceutical companies to
license its products to the MPP for use in all developing countries.
Any other incentive mechanisms should also be considered and,
where appropriate, developed for use in tandem with the MPP.
All available tools, both those currently in existence and
proposals for new mechanisms, must be used and considered to
protect the public health. While the MPP certainly has a significant
role to play, as evidenced by the recent license with Gilead covering
between 100 and 112 low- and middle-income countries, it is not the
only mechanism to improve access to medicines. Failure to take
advantage of other tools relies too heavily on a voluntary mechanism
without providing any additional leverage to improve upon the
current licenses, potentially setting unrealistic expectations for the
MPP. While the Gilead licenses should represent a floor, not a ceiling
for the MPP, building on the existing license requires governments
and civil society to coordinate their efforts and place additional
pressures to improve the public health. Patent pools, such as the
MPP, may represent one mechanism to promote access to medicines,
but they must be coupled with other strategies and alternatives to
maximize success.
122. For example, activists have participated in "pool parties" to encourage companies
such as Merck or Johnson & Johnson to join negotiations with the MPP. Armaghan N.
Behlum, Student 'Pool Party' Protests Merck: Global Health Groups Urge Big Pharma to
Give Poor Countries Discounts, HARVARD CRIMSON (Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.
thecrimson.com/article/2011/10/23/medical-students-protest-merck/; Ed Silverman,
Johnson & Johnson And Bikinis: A Patent Pool Party, PHARMALOT (Mar. 31 2011),
http://www.pharmalot.com/2011/03/johnson-johnson-and-bikinis-a-patent-pool-party/.
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